Reconstruction in Bosnia:
Implications for Food Security and the Future of Food Aid

Images of weeping women being evicted from their homes, strutting commanders victoriously entering yet another devastated village, and UN 'peacekeepers' arguing with obstinate soldiers to try to assure the safe passage of humanitarian aid, bombarded us from our TV screens for four long years of war in Bosnia. Since the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995, however, Bosnia has received little media attention while Larry Hollingworth has packed his bags and moved on to other war zones. The impression we are left with, is that there is no longer an emergency in Bosnia; that the problem is solved.

But is this true? Reconstruction is an extremely important part of emergency work; probably more important in the long-term than 'fire-fighting' in the acute stages of an emergency. In the case of Bosnia, the threat of food insecurity for some sections of the population is probably greater now than it was during the war.

The Dayton peace agreement, brokered by the Americans, recognised B&H as a single sovereign country divided into two Entities: the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska with 49 per cent of the territory and a population of 1.2 million; and the Muslim/Croat-controlled Federation of B&H with 51 per cent of the territory and a population of 2.3 million. The Federation is, in turn, divided into 10 cantons: five of which are predominantly Muslim; three predominantly Croat; and two which are ethnically mixed. At the lowest level, both the Republika Srpska and the Federation are divided into Municipalities (See figure 1).

Figure 1

Political Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina
National	Bosnia and Herzegovina 3-Person collective presidency; Council of Ministers; Bicameral Parliament.
Entity	Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina	Republika Srpska
	President; Government; Bicameral Parliament.	President; Government; Bicameral Parliament.
Canton	10 Cantons

The impact of the war and outstanding problems
The war left B&H in ruins. Out of an initial population of 4.3 million, an estimated 250,000 people were killed with a further 200,000 wounded of whom 13,000 have been left with permanent physical disabilities. About 11 .3 million people left the country as refugees of whom only six per cent have returned and a further one million were internally displaced of whom 360,000 remain homeless. The pre-war economy collapsed, and there was widespread destruction and damage to buildings and infrastructures. Direct war damages have been estimated at between US$15 and 20 billion, and 50 to 60 per cent of the population of working age are currently unemployed. Between 1.5 and 4 million landmines were planted during the war, and most have yet to be cleared.

Though the Dayton peace agreement put an end to active warfare, political security has yet to be established. No side can be said to have won the war in B&H leaving all sides disgruntled losers. Political insecurity coupled with the poor state of the economy and few economic opportunities means that there is little incentive to invest in the country. The majority of refugees and displaced are unable to return home either because they fear repercussions of returning to an area in which they are now part of an ethnic minority, or because their homes have been destroyed, or because the destruction in some areas is so complete that there will be no work, no schools, no health facilities etc on their return.

The reconstruction process
The World Bank have been nominated as the lead agency in the reconstruction process replacing UNHCR who were the lead UN agency during the war. The Bank believes that B&H faces three major challenges. Firstly, reconstruction - largely focusing on physical reconstruction. Secondly, rehabilitation of institutions of state, i.e. financial and governmental. Thirdly, the transition to a market economy as a natural development of the economic and political process started before the war.

Table 1: Aid commitments for reconstruction

	Aid commitments (US$ per capita)	GNP (US$ per capita)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	400	250-500
Rwanda	80-90	80
Mozambique	60-70	60

1. Food Aid Management comprising studies on food aid targeting, monetisation and food production surveys,
2. Reconstruction of Nutrition Services which included;
• national food and nutrition policy development,
• food and nutrition monitoring,
• programmes to prevent specific nutrition problems (notably anaemia and chronic dietary- related diseases).
• nutrition training and local capacity building, and
• development of a public information campaign aimed at promoting "healthy" dietary changes already provoked by the war.

The current good security and nutrition situation
Agricultural production has improved since the war ended but the problem of unexploded landmines remains. B&H was never self sufficient in food, however, and a large portion of the population remain dependent on the commercial market and imported food products. The quantity and range of foods on the market have increased dramatically in peace time and prices have fallen. But for many families with no form of employment, the purchase of food remains a problem. At the same time, services such as housing, electricity, water and medical care which were either free or highly subsidised during the socialist era, now have to be paid for placing greater financial demands on households. The transition towards a capitalist economy and increasing privatisation in the absence of jobs is likely to strain the financial resources of many families still further. At the present time, however, food aid distribution continues and there appear to be no major signs of undernutrition

Distribution and targeting of food aid
In 1996, nearly two million people received some form of free food aid which represented almost one third of the population and about 200,000 MT of food aid was distributed. The World Food Programme (WFP) is responsible for distributing a general ration and have adopted a sophisticated form of targeting whereby beneficiaries are classified into two groups: 'Priority One' and 'Priority Two'

Criteria for 'Priority One' beneficiaries are:

• institutionalised individuals
• people served in public kitchens
• individuals in collective centres
• individuals with monthly income <DM 25 plus one vulnerability factor (see Box)

Criteria for 'Priority Two' beneficiaries are:

• Individuals with a monthly income

A monthly income of DM 25 per month is the estimated minimum income necessary to cover basic food requirements (2,200 Kcals per day), while DM 75 per month is the estimated minimum income necessary to cover basic food and non-food needs. Household income is assessed by considering all sources of income(see box below). Per capita income is then derived so that household members can be classified on an individual basis as outlined above.

Local authorities are responsible for assessing eligibility for Priority One and Priority Two food aid groups and compiling lists of beneficiaries. In addition to the general ration, there are various programmes, supported largely by NGOs, which distribute supplementary foods (usually dried milk and so-called 'high protein' biscuits) to vulnerable groups (children, pregnant and lactating women, and the elderly), while some institutions such as kindergartens, orphanages, and old people's homes receive humanitarian aid in the form of food. The coverage of these programmes is not comprehensive, however, and many are being wound down. WFP is encouraging income generation programmes such as food for work programmes and seed distribution.

The present distribution system has not been without problems
First, the complicated targeting system has not been totally successful. The strategy to screen potential beneficiaries for entry into Priority One and Priority Two groups has been slower than expected and, one suspects, difficult to implement. Secondly, there has also been a continued reliance on geographical and special group targeting which may have been appropriate during the war but is less appropriate now when socio-economic circumstances are the major determinants of need. For example, there has been over-targeting of easily identifiable groups such as inhabitants of collective centres and under-targeting of less easily detectable vulnerable groups. Thirdly there have been problems related to distribution itself. Local authorities are sometimes reluctant to prioritise according to vulnerability and rather attempt to accommodate all into the system. Fourthly, there has been variation in the quantity and type of commodities received by beneficiaries causing dissatisfaction. Furthermore, there have been incidences where, for political reasons, groups have not received the aid due to them raising questions about who controls distribution. Finally, there is a lack of food security and nutrition monitoring which makes it extremely difficult to make informed decisions about appropriate targeting.

The future of food aid
There are a number of incentives to continue the distribution of food aid:

• it appeases western consciences,
• maintains political stability and is an attractive activity for many NGOs.

• it is expensive, and
• is becoming increasingly unjustifiable on the basis of need especially from an international perspective.

Problems with the distribution system: System is slow and complicated Less appropriate now than during war-time as need is determined largely by socio-economic factors Local authority control can mean: a) political bias and b) inadequate prioritisation based on vulnerability There is little data on food security or nutrition monitoring to inform this kind of system

See also the Post Script to this article.