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Food distribution in Mandera
district (Kenya)
By Manuel Duce-Marques
The author, Manuel Duce-Marques
is a qualified nurse who spent several years working for MSF Spain in Mandera
District, Northeast Kenya. He has just recently graduated with an MSc in
Human Nutrition from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Mandera
is one of three districts in the North-eastern Province of Kenya.
It is an area prone to drought and food insecurity and has a population
of 131,000 with 37,900 estimated as living in Central Mandera. The district
is geographically isolated and has weak links with other districts. Its
people are ethnic Somalis who are traditionally nomadic pastoralists but
now fall more into the category of agro-pastoralists as they practice some
cultivation of staple crops - maize and beans. Central Mandera has been
a settlement for Somali refugees since 1991 and about 10,000 of these refugees
still live in the former refugee camps which are now considered official
locations. During the severe drought of 1991-2 livestock holdings were
drastically reduced so that many families became destitute and were forced
to migrate to Central Mandera.
Between 1994-6 there were
three successive rain failures in the district. However, despite
a worsening 'alert' status* in the district, indicated by the Arid Lands
Resource Management early warning system and a series of MSF nutritional
surveys, the Kenyan government was reluctant to declare an emergency. MSF
Spain, who were initially contacted by a local NGO in March 1996 because
of its concerns about the plight of pastoralists in the district,
attempted to convince the Kenyan government, UN agencies (WFP) and other
NGOs in Nairobi to mount an emergency food intervention. This advocacy
did not prove effective. In May 1996, MSF recorded a 32.4% prevalence
of malnutrition in Mandera. An emergency was not officially declared until
February '97, and therefore no request for emergency food aid was made
until this date. In response to the deteriorating situation in Mandera,
MSF took the decision to step outside its usual mandate and implement
a general food distribution programme. An MSF team already present in the
area was given the task of designing and implementing the programme although
they had no prior experience of this type of intervention. It was
hoped that this would encourage other organisations, with experience of
general food distribution, to take over the programme.
Registration
The main objective of carrying
out a registration was to obtain 'reliable' figures for planning
the general ration distribution. Beneficiary numbers obtained from other
sources were often contradictory and believed to be inflated. Two
different types of registration procedure were selected for Fino division
and Central Mandera.
Central Mandera
The population in Central
Mandera (about 37,900 people) consisted of displaced persons and refugees/returnees.
It was clear that not everybody was equally affected by the drought so
that there were different levels of food insecurity. It was therefore necessary
to establish criteria for who should or should not be registered
for the general ration distribution.
After some consideration,
it was decided to target ration cards to families with a malnourished child
in one of the feeding centres (although it was recognised that this may
not necessarily target the most food insecure families as malnutrition
may be related to disease or poor caring practices). This led to an immediate
increase in admissions to the feeding centres. While this could be construed
as an advantage as feeding centre coverage improved, in part the
increase was due to cheating by registering the same child more than once
and by staff succumbing to community pressures to admit children who did
not fit the criteria. It also created negative consequences within the
centres, e.g. overcrowding resulting in increased risk of cross infection,
reduced staff / beneficiary ratio, reduced quality of supervision and increased
levels of dissatisfaction among mothers, leading to an increased proportion
of defaulters. As the situation ran out of control, the distribution
of ration cards was stopped. MSF could not find a way around the problem
of over-registration and ration cards were not distributed again. The total
number of ration cards which had been distributed were about 3,000, which
corresponded to a population coverage of 18,000.
Fino division
In Fino division it was
decided to implement a full registration (once off) for the entire
population. To reduce the potential for multiple registration, the exercise
was carried out simultaneously on one day for the 7 villages close
to Somalia and on the following day for the 8 villages close to Ethiopia.
The total number of ration cards distributed was 7,698 which was equivalent
to 26,900 beneficiaries.
Registration Process
Resources
After planning a rough schedule
for the registration and obtaining agreement with the community,
the programme had to be postponed for two months until the resources
became available. All the telecommunications material (radios) needed
for the security of the teams 'disappeared' in the Nairobi customs.
This, plus the bureaucratic red-tape that had to be negotiated to get all
the material back, added to the anxiety and impatience amongst locals and
increased pressure on our (MSF) teams as well as their own frustration
at the delays.
Timing
As some of the registration
points were close to Somalia and Ethiopia, it was decided to inform
leaders of the communities only a few days in advance about the registration
day to avoid artificial movements of population from neighbouring countries
and within Kenya itself. It was recognised that this might have prevented
some legitimate groups from registering but was still considered
necessary to ensure effective targeting of resources. However, in spite
of this precaution, the two month's delay allowed small new villages to
spring up around locations which were scheduled to be included in the registration.
System used
Families were made to sit
in lines and wait some distance away from the registration point. Community
leaders would send a few families at a time to the clerks to avoid overcrowding.
During the registration process, every member of the family put one finger
in highly concentrated Gentian Violet (GV) to indicate ration card
receipt thereby avoiding double registration. However, the main problem
was that a very similar method was used in the elections in Kenya
and people knew very well how to clean off the dye. Before registration
they greased their fingers with coconut oil and afterwards they cleaned
the GV with fuel and lemon. It was obvious that the plan had to be
changed. Chiefs were therefore asked to gather all the population in one
place early in the morning where each member of the family would be given
a piece of paper with an MSF stamp on it (this was difficult to duplicate).
The paper would then be collected during registration. This proved to be
a far more effective method than the previous one.
Registration form
Ration cards serve the dual
purpose of ensuring that the beneficiary receives the food and also
facilitates control over the distribution.
The information on the ration
card was rewritten in a register: card number, name of the head of family,
number of dependants, number of children under five and number of pregnant
and lactating women. MUAC measurements of all the children under 5 were
initially undertaken but this led to crowding and confusion, so the
practice was stopped.
Security
Registration of large numbers
of people at one point can take a long time. As the day wears on
discomfort for beneficiaries and programme implementors increases. Therefore
minimum conditions of security are needed to ensure success. Responsibility
for security was given to the chief of each location. They were given information
about how the registration would be carried out and the roles of
the various people involved. In addition, the community of each location
was responsible for ensuring that the registration point was kept 'intact'.
They would often prepare fences around the site made with bushes.
In the few locations where different clans were represented there would
often be a dominant group who influenced the proceedings, trying
to register favoured persons more than once. This would lead
to mounting tensions (in rare cases leading to violence) and sometimes
we could not finish the registration which probably meant that the most
vulnerable families (who were likely to be last in the queues) did not
receive the ration cards.
Conclusion
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The registration process was
efficiently carried out with the help of the local authorities and traditional
leaders and there were only a few security problems. However, we
found that dishonesty amongst the staff and organised pressure from powerful
people meant that even this method of registration could only limit rather
than entirely prevent abuse .
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The cost of the registration
was not high as most of the logistical infrastructure was already in place
in the programme and extra-expatriates were seconded from other MSF programmes
in the area. However, the use of these staff meant that some feeding centre
activities had to be curtailed.
General
Ration Distribution
Two members of MSF came
especially to take charge of the food distribution in Fino Division. However
everybody in the team was involved; the field co-ordinator was in charge
of all negotiations with local government and other players, the MSF administrator
was in charge of buying food items and renting all the cars and lorries,
the logistician for the feeding centres was in charge of the storage of
the food. Distribution was directed to the family unit. A family member
collected the ration at a distribution point. The family ration was measured
by volume by MSF staff using scoops after presentation and verification
of the ration card. The card was stamped and marked for each item collected
by making a hole in a specific place. The ration consisted of 4.5
kg of maize, 3 kg of beans, and 1 kg of oil per person per month, which
was equivalent to 1100 Kcal/day. In addition to these basic commodities,
7.5 Kg of a blended food (UNIMIX), was included for children under five
years of age and pregnant and lactating women. This contributed a
further 1000 Kcal/day. The ration was set at this level based on
the theoretical quantity required and what was feasible at field level,
given resource and logistical constraints. A local teacher from each distribution
point was trained to teach mothers about the correct preparation of the
UNIMIX .
Central Mandera
The first distribution was
carried out at the end of November. The distribution points were
the supplementary feeding centres. Food distributions were carried out
once a month. To prevent families trying to collect the food at more than
one feeding centre, the distribution was carried out in all three centres
at the same time. In view of the fact that it would be easy to exaggerate
numbers in a family a standard ration card for 6 members was distributed
to beneficiaries. Feeding centre staff did the distribution. However as
they were part of the community they were prone to giving more food to
members of their own tribe. Plans were therefore made to move staff from
one centre
to another, but as it happened
this was not necessary as our capacity to control staff activities improved.
Fino Division
In most cases there was
one distribution point for each location which minimised both the number
of people who attended any distribution at one time and the distance travelled
to load the food. Because of the large number of distribution points and
the logistic capacity the distribution was carried out monthly. The food
needed for Fino division for one month was about 350 tons, ranging from
2 to 35 tons for the different locations.
Distribution Procedure
Staff
The distribution staff
consisted of the 2 expatriates, 20 local MSF staff and between 4-6 watchmen.
There were also loaders from the local area.
Distribution point
The recipient community
waited some distance away from the distribution point to minimise overcrowding
around the distribution point. The structure of the distribution centre
was made from wood and was located close to some existing local infrastructure
(e.g. school, etc.). On the day of the distribution a plastic sheet was
placed on the roof to protect the team from the sun. The simple structure
allowed for crowd control and there was one entrance and one exit. Two
lines of people were served in parallel. Each line required one clerk to
check the cards with the register books; 1-2 people to distribute each
commodity and 1 supervisor. One expatriate staff member remained with the
clerk with another at the end of the chain.
Food losses
A small percentage of losses
(around 10%) was considered acceptable. However, commodities of high value
(e.g. oil), were more likely to disappear. Food losses occurred for
a variety of reasons:
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Losses from the lorry: we counted
the numbers of bags in the lorries before and after the trip. If some bags
were lost during the trip the value was discounted from the rent of the
trucks or from the driver's salary. However, a frequent practice was to
make holes in the bags, and then collect the food from the floor of the
lorry. This could result in hundreds of kilos of grain being lost.
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Diversion by staff and chiefs:
the staff were given 3 warnings if they were suspected or seen to be mismanaging
the food in the distribution. After the third warning they would be sacked
without compensation. However replacement staff were often caught doing
exactly the same as their predecessors.
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Over-Scooping: scoopers might
give fuller scoops to relatives or friends. The accumulated loss meant
that many received less than they should have. The only way to control
this was through randomly weighing some of the bags received by the family
representative and comparing the weight with the number of people who were
supposed to receive the food. Surplus was removed and low weight bags were
replenished. This task was very labour-intensive for both the scoopers
and the controllers.
-
Altering Ration Cards: owners
of a ration card might increase the number of beneficiaries on their cards
(e.g. if there were 5 on their card they wrote the number one in the front
to make it appear as if it were 15). So, careful control of each card was
necessary. We found that in some cases our own staff changed the number
in the book.
-
Packing errors: sometimes low
weight bags were sent from the factory. This was attributed either to water
losses from the maize (when it is packed fresh and subsequently dries out)
or to the bag being under-filled in the factory.
-
Poor quality foods: other losses
occurred when some food items (mainly UNIMIX) had to be discarded due to
poor quality or spoilage. Poor quality might be due to poor quality food
being packed, poor transport conditions and lack of adequate ventilation
systems in the stores. MSF managed to improve storage conditions.
Security
As there is no physical
or controlled border with Somalia, Mandera town and the border areas are
considered to be unsafe. Bandits regularly make raids on Kenyan territory.
The risk of attack by Somali groups during the distribution was therefore
very high. MSF policy on security was very clear, i.e. not paying for security
and not enlisting armed guards for MSF vehicles (with the exception of
Somalia). Insecurity presented a number of problems for the programme.
a) Security during the distribution
was the responsibility of the local chief/traditional authority of each
location. Their duty was to negotiate with local government to obtain enough
security to guarantee a safe distribution. MSF stressed that at the first
sign of insecurity, distribution would be stopped. In most cases the distribution
system worked very well, but in a few locations after the relatives of
the local leaders had received their rations, their interest in the efficient
functioning of the distribution system waned and powerful individuals were
able to take more food than they were entitled to leading to beneficiary
dissatisfaction and unrest. MSF were then forced to withdraw.
MSF´s policy of abandoning an area under these conditions, sometimes
led to undermining the power of some corrupt leaders. MSF would return
the following month to try again and the community would attempt
to change the leadership to ensure more secure future distributions.
b) MSF decided to start without
any protection for the food convoys. However, following a number of attacks
by bandits coming from Somalia on vehicles, the decision was taken to stop
the distribution of food until local government could provide, at their
own costs, the security necessary to guarantee us the distribution. This
was explained to the leaders at all the locations who also informed local
government. This was a shock for the government as all other organisations
in the area (including UN agencies) paid for this service. After three
weeks of discussions (and no distribution) MSF and local government arrived
at an agreement. Local government paid for police protection and each of
the local ministries in Mandera agreed to provide cars with petrol. However,
these measures created their own problems e.g. often the car didn't have
petrol, difficulties in finding the person to authorise the payment for
the petrol, cars arriving late etc. Due to the high level of insecurity
in the area and frequency of theft, we were advised the cars had to be
rented in the same location. These cars were in a bad condition and needed
constant attention.
Other problems
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Lost ration cards: an individual
reporting a lost ration card at the distribution had to wait until the
distribution was finished. If another potential beneficiary turned up with
the reported lost card, he/she was also told to wait until the distribution
was finished. The decision about the rightful owner of the card was made
together with the village leader. If nobody turned up with the lost card,
a new card was prepared (with a special mark to ensure the recipient could
not claim ownership of two cards at the next distribution).
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How to check who is pregnant?
What is the limit for lactating women? Pregnancy had to be visually confirmed,
and a mother with a child of about 1 year would be classified as a lactating
woman. However, the percentage of pregnant and lactating women was clearly
over-reported. This was a problem that was very difficult to overcome.
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The quality of the distributed
beans was variable, which caused complaints amongst some beneficiaries
and on occasions created delays during the distribution.
Main Findings
Our experience showed that
a certain level of food losses was inevitable and that powerful, well connected
households often received more than their fair share of the ration, usually
at the expense of the weak and vulnerable. Security and monitoring mechanisms
could reduce some of these abuses but we were forced to be realistic about
the extent to which we could effect change. Some leaders forced households
to pay to them a part of the ration received. We did not attempt to interfere
with this practice. We learned many lessons about how to improve the efficacy
and equity of the food distribution system, but came to realise that there
were certain aspects of the distribution chain over which we had only limited
control. While the objective of providing the general ration was to ensure
nutritional well-being, it was clear that a number of households sold the
food and therefore used the food as an income transfer, which allowed expenditure
on non-food items. This created disappointment amongst some expatriate
staff who assumed that the beneficiaries would eat all of what was provided.
While, from my point of view, this exchange of rations can be acceptable
and sometimes necessary, the process can also be inefficient as the money/goods
exchanged for the food is less than the monetary equivalent of its nutritional
value.
The two expatriates in charge
of the organisation of the general food distribution in Fino division were
very frustrated by the fact that they were mainly involved in the arduous
tasks of policing the distribution rather than acting as logisticians.
The MSF team were too focused
on the process of controlling the delivery of food and therefore paid insufficient
attention to monitoring what happened with the food at household level.
This made it difficult to fully assess the impact of the programme, e.g.
what food ended up in the household.
We believed from the start
that it was very important to involve all the actors in the area (local
authorities, government, the community, UN agencies and other NGOs) in
the programme. If resources are limited (as they were in this case), then
it is even more important that local government contribute resources within
their capacity.
*"indicators show unusual
fluctuations outside expected seasonal ranges, and asset levels of households
are too low to provide an
adequate subsistence
level and vulnerability to food insecurity is still high".
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