

Executive Summary

Introduction

The 1994 Rwanda genocide and its aftermath in Rwanda and neighboring countries of the Great Lakes Region count as one of the most horrific manmade calamities of recorded history. Given the institutional and technological instruments that could have been applied to prevent or greatly reduce the genocide, and the contextual factors that increased the likelihood of success, it also counts as one of the most colossal culpabilities of the international community in recent history.

In late 1994 at the initiative of the Evaluation Department of the Danish Foreign Ministry, representatives of bilateral donors, UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, formed a Steering Committee to sponsor an international evaluation, the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Joint Evaluation), also known as The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Commencing in January 1995, the evaluation was undertaken over a 15-month period by international teams numbering 52 consultants and researchers that produced four studies plus a synthesis report covering all phases of the crisis.

In preparation for the ALNAP 15th Biannual Meeting commemorating the tenth anniversary of the genocide, ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) and Danida approached the two current authors who had been team leaders within the overall Joint Evaluation, to undertake an assessment of the follow-up of recommendations eight years after publication of the Joint Evaluation and 10 years after the genocide. This report constitutes that assessment.

The core of the assessment comprises:

- a review of citations and use of the Joint Evaluation in the literature
- a review of developments in the three broad fields of: prevention and preparedness; humanitarian response; and rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery, and an assessment of the extent to which these are consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Evaluation.

Citation in the literature and official reports, and by key informants

Sixty four books, articles and reports dealing with the Rwanda genocide, its aftermath, and related subjects, were examined to assess their use of, and reference to, the Joint Evaluation. The 40 key informants were also asked about their impressions of how the Joint Evaluation had been used and influenced policy and practice. Most, but not all, key informants were at least generally aware of the Joint Evaluation. They have cited it in their own works and they can identify publications where the Joint Evaluation has been cited. Thirty-seven of the 64 sources contain at least one reference to the Joint Evaluation and some key sources made extensive use of the Joint Evaluation. With some caveats we therefore conclude that the Joint Evaluation had a wide reach in the research and policy communities.

To provide insight into how the Joint Evaluation had fed into policy processes, we studied eleven reports that we and the key informants regarded as being particularly signifi-

cant and influential in the formation of policy. These eleven reports included the reports of: the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; the Belgian Senate's Commission of Inquiry; the Mission of Information undertaken by the French National Assembly; the inquiries on the genocide undertaken by the UN and the OAU; three key reports and policy guidance on conflict and security system reform issued by the OECD Development Assistance Committee; the so-called 'Brahimi' Report on UN Peace Operations; the 'Responsibility to Protect' report by the Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and the OECD/DAC Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship.

Five of these reports refer explicitly to the Joint Evaluation. The OAU Report cites the evaluation 43 times, far more than any other source. The Joint Evaluation is not cited by the other six reports. There is clear evidence in the literature and from key informants that the Joint Evaluation stimulated further research and analysis of complex emergencies and the tendency toward genocide. It has also been used widely as a teaching resource at the college and university levels. Not least of the impacts traceable to the Joint Evaluation is the impetus it gave to efforts such as the Sphere Project and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership to improve accountability and performance in the humanitarian sector. In addition the Joint Evaluation had a positive impact on analytical and evaluation capacities in humanitarian assistance organizations, including the formation of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). Offsetting these impacts is the fact that those charged with analysis and evaluation still tend to be isolated from those charged with policy and program development, especially in official development agencies.

Key informants saw the Joint Evaluation as pioneering in the following ways:

- It was the first report to be published that assessed the performance of the international community in all phases of the genocide. As one interlocutor put it, "The speed with which the Joint Evaluation was done was important".
- The unusually wide scope of the Joint Evaluation was also valued: Informants saw it as being the only review of the Rwanda genocide that assessed in the same analysis all elements of the involved international community.
- Other factors cited were the inclusive governance of the Joint Evaluation which gave the evaluation political weight and "voice." The fact that its Steering Committee included the same elements as those to whom the evaluation was addressed increased its credibility.

Prevention and preparedness

The field of prevention and preparedness encompasses instruments for avoiding and reducing instances of conflict and genocide, as well as for anticipating, detecting, and preventing violent conflict and genocide. Developments in the following ten categories of instruments were reviewed: diplomacy; aid process; human rights machinery; justice and law enforcement systems; arms flows and embargoes; peace agreements; early warning; military intervention; and establishing preparedness and contingency measures.

A main conclusion is that while there has been some progress in applying several of these instruments, the international community has failed to view them all in systemic terms and to agree on a strategy for applying the instruments vigorously and systematically. This applies within as well as among the above categories. For example, a range of tools under diplomatic conditionality, short of military intervention, should be considered and applied if warranted by the situation and there is a chance of their having an

effect. The strategy should include not just the classic demarche, or diplomatic visit to express concern, but threats to withhold visas, freeze bank accounts, reduce or cancel development and other assistance, and impose trade sanctions or embargoes – and a plan to implement these measures.

The Joint Evaluation recommended a systematic study of past experience with positive and negative conditionality, and that drawing from such a study, a clear and uniform policy be formulated, after consultations within and among such bodies as the OECD Development Assistance Committee, the Development Committee for the Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks, and the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Such a study has yet to be undertaken.

Although it did not receive extensive coverage, the Joint Evaluation concluded that international assistance agencies were insensitive to the question of what impact their assistance might be having on tendencies toward violent conflict and genocide. This is consistent with the findings of subsequent, more intensive research. Peter Uvin, who has explored this issue in most depth, finds that virtually all international donors to Rwanda during the years leading up to the genocide were generally blind to what was happening (or acted as if they were). His analysis also finds that resources provided by donors (particularly the IMF and the World Bank), contributed essential wherewithal (e.g. foreign exchange to import arms and machetes) to carry out the genocide (Uvin 1998).

Monitoring of human rights abuses can be an important tool in the arsenal of genocide prevention. Monitoring has arguably been more systematic and visible before and during recent major violent conflicts than was the case in Rwanda. Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Darfur are likely exceptions. Human rights monitoring initiatives have generally come from international groups, both intergovernmental bodies and international NGOs (INGOs). Indigenous civil society organizations have recently become involved as well. Rwanda was a trial field effort for the new High Commissioner on Human Rights (HCHR), but its four-year history in Rwanda was dismal, owing to very poor support from headquarters, Government of Rwanda (GoR) opposition, and varying leadership.

The Joint Evaluation called for rigorously enforced arms embargoes, pointing in particular to source countries. Over the intervening years, elements of the international community have paid considerable attention to arms movements. But it is not apparent that the effectiveness of arms embargoes and controls has increased. Conferences on the subject have enjoined participants to: “ensure,” “encourage,” and “promote.” One consideration that undoubtedly comes into play is the conflict of interest manifested by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council who are also the top arms suppliers worldwide.

Many observers identified lack of pre-genocide early warning as a serious issue in the Rwanda genocide. The Joint Evaluation stressed analysis and scenario building as the main gaps and recommended that a unit for this purpose be established in the UN Secretary General’s Office. No such unit has been established, though units have been established and/or strengthened in several UN offices, such as OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance). Two recent developments could have a major impact on the capacity of the UN system to identify, analyze, and take actions on conflict and genocide information. On April 7, 2004, the Secretary General announced his intention to appoint a Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention and the appointee,

Juan Mendez, was announced in July 2004. The Secretary General has also established a High Level Panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change.” The panel is examining policy and systemic issues in the UN system and is to submit its report by the end of 2004.

Military intervention under the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was flawed from the beginning. It had a weak mandate, was poorly resourced and was reduced rather than strengthened in response to the start of the genocide. The Joint Evaluation recommended that the creation of a Peacekeeping “Chapter 6.5” Mandate that would provide a stronger mandate including the protection of civilians. In the event the “6.5” mandate has not been established but has been superseded by a greater willingness by the Security Council to authorize Chapter 7 mandates for interventions by individual members proposing to intervene in a situation (eg. British troops in Sierra Leone and the Australian-led INTERFET in Timor Leste).

In Africa itself there have been some encouraging developments. Significant progress has been made in the development of sub-regional capacities for intervention, particularly in West Africa through ECOWAS. Under the OAU, state sovereignty was paramount and non-interference was its trademark. The 2002 replacement of the OAU with the African Union, with clear commitments in its Constitutive Act to human rights and maintaining peace, and its 15 Member Peace and Security Council, appears to signal a stronger approach to massive human rights abuses in member states. Though belated and modest the recent deployment of 300 AU troops to protect international monitors in Darfur is a positive step.

The Joint Evaluation made two sets of recommendations with regard to preparedness and contingency measures. The first was that all agencies and donors should develop policies and procedures for undertaking needs and capacities assessments, contingency planning, preparedness measures and procurement of supplies and equipment for cost-effective interventions, as well as for cost-effective investments in mitigating critical logistical bottlenecks. The second was addressed specifically to donors and agencies funding implementing partners that they should be prepared to provide increased ‘up-front’ funding to agencies for contingency planning and preparedness measures for major complex emergencies and honor pledges to do so and develop “a common understanding regarding mutually acceptable levels of investment in contingency planning and preparedness measures and accompanying levels of risk.”

There have been a number of initiatives and the development of mechanisms over the last few years in this field. One initiative has been the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP – comprising the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and the Netherlands) with the objective of providing tailor-made, mobile, flexible, rapidly deployable support modules for UN missions. The UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams (UNDAC) and the Humanitarian Information Centers have been important beneficiaries of the IHP emergency support modules to date. Whilst there have been improvements in contingency planning and preparedness by many of the larger agencies and some notable inter-agency collaboration in relation to high profile anticipated crisis events (eg. anticipated refugee outflows from Afghanistan and Iraq) it appears that many agencies continue to experience difficulty in translating contingency plans into practical operational plans.

The Joint Evaluation found that inadequate and inaccurate reporting on the genocide by the international media contributed to international indifference and inaction. This fail-

ure occurred in spite of local media, which became dominated in the early 1990s by a radio station and newspaper whose vitriolic propaganda incited hatred and violence. The Joint Evaluation recommended that the media should review their reporting on Rwanda and organize a conference for and by the international media to examine media reporting on Rwanda and draw lessons for responsible reporting on future complex emergencies. Several conferences have been held since 1994 that have focused on the role of the media in the Rwanda genocide. But these have not been widely attended by frontline media personnel, who are not “conference goers.” A more effective approach would be to introduce the lessons of the media’s role in Rwanda into the courses of major journalism schools and into special mid-career graduate courses offered to journalists at top universities.

Humanitarian response

Two key findings of the Joint Evaluation in relation to the humanitarian response were that:

- a) The international community had in effect used humanitarian aid as a form of substitute for effective political and military action. Governments had provided generous funding for the humanitarian response at the same time as reducing rather than reinforcing UNAMIR and failing to respond to UN proposals to deploy a force to disarm the ex-FAR troops and the militia in the massive refugee camps and provide security in the camps. This approach was described in terms of ‘a lack of policy coherence’ which had placed humanitarian agencies in situations that were often untenable from the perspectives of both security and ethically.
- b) Whilst there had been shortcomings in the response by the humanitarian sector, these had been responsible for considerably fewer deaths than could be attributed to the abysmal shortcomings in the diplomatic, political and military response by the international community to the genocide. The approximately 50,000 deaths that occurred during 1994 as a result of diseases such as cholera and dysentery, compared to the approximately 800,000 killed during the genocide. Among the factors contributing to the shortcomings in the humanitarian response the Joint Evaluation highlighted weaknesses in response capacity, coordination, the monitoring of the effectiveness of overall efforts, the professionalism of some NGOs and accountability mechanisms in the sector generally.

As one means of improving ‘policy coherence’ the Joint Evaluation recommended the establishment of a Humanitarian Sub-Committee of the Security Council (SC) to ensure adequate consideration of the humanitarian dimension in the SC. No such committee has been established, though the SC did commence briefing sessions from humanitarian agencies outside the UN system. In 1997 the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was superseded by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and its mandate included a responsibility of ‘advocacy of humanitarian issues with political organs notably the Security Council’. The case for more effective consideration of humanitarian issues by the Security Council appears to remain. It engaged with the Darfur crisis in March 2004 only after the UN Resident Coordinator had given a series of international media interviews characterizing the situation as the ‘world’s worst humanitarian crisis’ and ‘close to ethnic cleansing’ and 12 months after the start of the rebellion and its repression by the *Janjaweed* militia.

As another means of improving ‘policy coherence’ the Joint Evaluation recommended that the UN Secretariat establish a team of senior advisers for all complex emergencies to synthesize crisis information, bring coherent policy options to the Secretary-General and formulate a framework for an integrated UN line of command between headquarters and the field, and within the field, for political action, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. This recommendation and its subsequent interpretation have proven contentious. A series of organizational and policy reforms in the UN as a result of the 1997 ‘Program for Reform’ (the Strong report) and the 2000 ‘Panel on Peace Operations’ (the Brahimi Report) have led to much greater integration of the different areas of UN activity in conflict-affected areas, particularly where UN peacekeeping forces are deployed. Independent assessments of the results of this ‘search for coherence’ conclude that humanitarian objectives are consistently being pushed into ‘the back seat’ in UN peace operations and that the integrationist approach to coherence needs to be rethought.

In response to requests from the Steering Committee, the final report of the Joint Evaluation offered options in relation to certain recommendations intended to address identified shortcomings in humanitarian response. One of the more radical recommendations intended to address weaknesses in coordination – the consolidation of the UN’s various humanitarian response capacities into one agency came very close to being recommended by the 1997 Strong report. Since then the approach has been very much one of encouraging closer and more effective working between the various UN agencies by way of a range of different approaches and mechanisms: the creation of OCHA in 1997; the Humanitarian Coordinator system, UN country teams; the work of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and its various Working Groups; increased use of inter-agency missions and teams; and the Consolidated Appeals Process and its more recent component – the Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan. Such measures are generally judged to have improved field level coordination, though challenges remain in filling the gaps between mandates and capacities and broader system-wide problems.

The Joint Evaluation saw two broad options in the approach to improving NGO performance: self-managed regulation or an international system of accreditation. Faced with the prospect of an accreditation system being imposed on NGOs many collaborated on a range of independent initiatives to improve performance and overall accountability. Many agencies have increased their investment in training, staff development and more rigorous recruitment procedures and the technical knowledge and caliber of personnel appears to have improved in many agencies. Perhaps the most critical development in the sector was the Sphere Project to develop minimum technical standards in relation to: water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security, nutrition and food aid; shelter settlement and non-food items; and health services. Widely translated and disseminated, incorporated into training and increasingly integrated into monitoring and evaluation systems by donor organizations and UN agencies as well as by NGOs, the Sphere standards have become an important part of the vocabulary of performance and accountability in the humanitarian sector. Many observers agree that the NGO sector has made significant improvements in the areas of professionalism, standards and accountability mechanisms since 1996 and some see this as the area where the Joint Evaluation has had the greatest impact.

Rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery

The post-conflict period has several dimensions, including economic growth, international assistance, economic and political stability, justice and human rights, and reconciliation. The economic recovery of Rwanda at the macro level has been impressive.

Since 1998 real GDP growth has averaged about 6% a year, which is expected to continue through 2005. But a major driver of recent economic growth has been a favorable world coffee market, something that cannot be counted on. Moreover, data on how the benefits of economic recovery have been shared are contradictory. Many observers would argue that the political and social sustainability of recovery is far from achieved.

Responding to substantial lags in the provision of international assistance pledged to Rwanda in the first two years after the genocide, the Joint Evaluation called for flexible, fast-disbursing post-genocide assistance. There has been some improvement in the performance of donors in these respects. In Rwanda, the volume of British aid has grown substantially, with about half provided as general budget support under the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Budget support is, at least in principle and intent, more flexible and faster disbursing than project aid. In general though there has been little international appetite for a third pillar 'recovery fund' (between emergency and development budgets).

Research subsequent to the Joint Evaluation has shown that international donors and development agencies have tended to push traditional economic policy reforms before they are appropriate for post-conflict countries. This was evident in the early pressure by the Bretton Woods institutions for privatization soon after the Rwandan genocide. There are other instances where trade and other reforms have been pushed prematurely. In these cases macroeconomic reforms have countered political stability and the objective of peace, when they should be compatible and mutually reinforcing.

The issue of aid not being made conditional on adherence to international human rights standards and democratic values was highlighted by the Joint Evaluation and developed in subsequent work by Peter Uvin. In their generous provision of aid to the GoR some donors have been slow to call the government to account for its human rights abuses, its deep military involvement in the DRC and the gradual development of a centralized and autocratic rule by President Kagame. In this sense a key lesson from before the genocide is not being applied in present day Rwanda.

The Joint Evaluation found a critical need to strengthen the Rwandan system of justice. It was immediately apparent that two systems were needed: an external mechanism to try those accused of crimes against humanity who had fled Rwanda, and an internal system to try the accused who remained in Rwanda. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in Arusha, Tanzania, in November 1994, to try the accused in exile. Notwithstanding the Joint Evaluation recommendation to provide an adequate budget to the ICTR, the international community was slow in providing the resources needed. As of mid-2004, about 70 persons have been indicted and tried by the ICTR. Critics have pointed to ICTR costs, about USD 8 million per indictment, or USD 25 million per conviction. Others point to the new body of international criminal law that has been established that will be important for the future, including for the new International Criminal Court (ICC). International efforts to establish an ICC, a move supported by a recommendation of the Joint Evaluation, finally bore fruit when the ICC was established in 2002.

The Joint Evaluation called for development and support for a comprehensive plan for reconstruction of the Rwandan justice system. Notwithstanding some initial delays, donors did provide substantial, well-coordinated assistance to the internal Rwanda justice system (over USD 100 million by one estimate). The GoR adapted in 2001 the traditional "gacaca" system of community-based justice for judging those accused of lower level

participation in the genocide. After massive training for thousands of village judges, the program is finally getting underway. In the meantime, some of the more notorious perpetrators of genocide have been tried in formal courts and 22 executed. Others have been released from prison, often drawing criticism from the public and from the survivors of the genocide, in particular. Critics point to a one-sided bias in the Rwandan internal justice system (as well as in the ICTR) in that crimes against humanity perpetrated by current GoR forces do not get brought to justice and punished.

Reconciliation has been a slow, halting process in Rwanda. The obstacles include the slow progress of the justice system, a perceived one-sided approach by the system, and distrust of would be reconcilers, such as church leaders. The policy of the Government of Rwanda to deny ethnic difference and create an identity based on nationality rather than ethnicity may be the only long term solution but many observers view the policy and the unavoidable demographic reality of a country ruled by a Government largely composed of an ethnic minority as being unsustainable. Some see recognition of the good as well as the bad deeds of the respective ethnic groups as being essential for the reconciliation process. That is, recalling memory, not suppressing it (LeMarchand 2004). The international community has tried to be helpful; for example, by facilitating the sharing of experience from Israel and South Africa, and by supporting trauma counseling. But the needs are vast and the experiences and techniques from other countries tend not to transfer well. Toleration may be a more attainable goal for Rwanda than reconciliation.

Darfur and the Eastern DRC: Test Cases for the Joint Evaluation

In many respects events in Zaire/DRC since the Joint Evaluation was published represent a continuation of the conflict and genocide of 1994 and stem directly from the failure of the international community to isolate and control the Rwandan Army (FAR) and Hutu militia elements among the bona fide refugees during 1994-96. In order to reduce the security threat presented by the ex-FAR and militias Rwanda has since twice invaded Zaire/DRC and provided critical support to Congolese proxies. The second invasion in 1998 which pitched Rwandan and Ugandan troops against troops from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in support of the government of Laurent Kabila became the most destructive and widespread conflict yet witnessed in modern Africa. An estimated 3.5 million people have died since 1998 as a result of the fighting or the deterioration it has caused in food security and health. With its moral authority to confront Rwandan aggression weakened by its failure to halt the Rwanda genocide and its ability to act collectively limited by the differing approaches to relations with the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda, the international community's response was initially supine. Despite the lessons of UNAMIR and the Brahimi Report's call for robust mandates and well equipped forces, the modest UN peacekeeping force in DRC has had a weak mandate, and been poorly equipped.

It was not until 2002, after powerful evidence was produced of Rwandan and Ugandan exploitation of Congo's natural resources, the human rights abuses and the appalling death toll caused by the conflict that the international community began to publicly condemn Rwanda and Uganda. Even now, long after the ex FAR and militias have been neutered, Rwanda continues to exert a critical influence over the DRC's political transition process and has been found to have supported the (fortunately short-lived) rebel capture of Bukavu in May/June 2004.

The loss of over 3 million lives in the eastern DRC as a result of the conflict that began in 1998 implies appalling failings in the international communities instruments and

institutions for mitigating conflicts and their humanitarian effects. Given the enormity of what has happened in eastern DRC and the seriousness of the accusations being leveled at the international community, the UN and the humanitarian sector generally, the DRC case deserves to be subjected to an evaluation as thorough, transparent and wide ranging as the Joint Evaluation.

The current case of Darfur also suggests that many of the lessons from the Rwanda genocide and the recommendations of the Joint Evaluation have not resulted in improved practice. Whilst there are some important differences between the Rwanda and Darfur cases, there are also some similarities – notably the issue of sovereignty, the emphasis given to keeping a peace process on track and not confronting human rights abuses for fear of upsetting that process, and a tardy response by the international community to mass killings and ‘ethnic cleansing’. Attacks by the rebels on Government targets and the response by the *Janjaweed* Arab militia in attacking and forcibly displacing civilians of black African origin began in early 2003 and yet the Security Council did not actively engage with the issue for a year and it was not until July 2004 that a small AU force was deployed to protect ceasefire monitors. By the time of writing in September 2004 the Security Council had still not even taken the step of introducing sanctions in response to the Government’s failure to comply with earlier resolutions demanding action by the Security Council, let alone more forceful steps such as imposing a no-fly zone on the Sudanese Airforce to prevent its bombing villages in support of *Janjaweed* attacks. Whilst a build-up of the current AU contingent appears quite likely it is less likely that they will be given a mandate expressly to protect civilians. Forceful military intervention by non-AU forces looks remote.

While being tardy in its response to address the security and protection issues on the ground the Security Council has simultaneously been encouraging and pressing for an increased presence of humanitarian agencies in Darfur. The Joint Evaluation’s conclusion that ‘humanitarian action cannot substitute for political action’ is once again being ignored. The Joint Evaluation’s recommendation that a Humanitarian Sub-Committee of the Security Council be established was neither considered nor implemented. The Darfur case, the difficulties being experienced by the humanitarian community in relation to the ‘integrated mission’ model for peacekeeping operations and the need for a stronger voice for the humanitarian community in the political milieu of the Security Council justify serious consideration of the original Humanitarian Sub-Committee proposal.

A particularly worrying element of the Darfur story has been the reluctance to use the term ‘genocide’ even though several of the criteria of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide (emphasis added) appear to have been met. In September 2004 the US Secretary of State concluded that a genocide had occurred though the US remains the only state to have publicly drawn this conclusion. As in 1994, states are avoiding use of the term because they are reluctant to undertake direct interventions as required under the Convention. This leads us to join the OAU Eminent Personalities who, in their ‘Rwanda the Preventable Genocide’ report (OAU 2000) called for a review of the Convention that would clarify the definition, the criteria that have to be met and the obligations that ensue.

Ideally the Secretary General’s new Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention will have the authority and capacity to determine when the genocide term becomes applicable independently of the member states that would be likely to be involved in any intervention to ‘prevent’, let alone mitigate it. We also propose that an independent high-level

Genocide Panel, composed of three to five highly respected Nobel Peace Laureates be established. This “Nobel Genocide Panel” would provide independent support to the Special Advisor and the Secretary General. The reports of the Panel would be presented to the Security Council and would be public.

Conclusion

The critical test is whether reports and policy prescriptions, explicitly attributed to the Joint Evaluation, get translated into practice. This assessment has revealed a number of areas where the Joint Evaluation had a positive influence and impact. It has also revealed recommendations that were not implemented that remain valid and warrant further efforts to implement them. Even allowing for the achievements in the humanitarian sector in relation to accountability, standards and greater professionalism, on the central issue of the prevention and suppression of genocide and massive human rights abuses our assessment yields a conclusion that is on balance pessimistic; a conclusion that is supported by much of the literature many of our interlocutors, the literature and examination of the Darfur case. Several interlocutors proposed that massive public interest mobilization campaigns would be required to put sufficient pressure on decision makers in key countries to get action on an issue like genocide prevention and intervention. The successful global campaign against landmines demonstrated what can be achieved by such campaigns.