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Kosovo Evaluation

During 1998 and early 1999 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbian) forces increased their efforts to 'ethnically cleanse' Kosovo. They justified this on the basis that they were 'cleaning out' Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) bases. In response, NATO forces launched air strikes against the Federal Yugoslavia Republic (FYR) in March 1999. The war between FYR and NATO forced displacement from Kosovo and precipitated a major humanitarian emergency involving the largest and fastest movement of people in Europe since World War II.

The Disaster Executive Committee (DEC) launched its Kosovo appeal on 6th April 1999. This appeal raised over 50 million pounds sterling, which was shared out between 12 British agencies; the largest share going to Oxfam (about 30% of the total raised). The DEC subsequently commissioned an independent evaluation¹ of phase 1 and 2 of expenditure of the appeal funds covering the period from 6th April 1999 to 31st January 2000.This time period covered the massive outflow of Albanians from Kosovo to Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia, their return to Kosovo and the resulting outflow of Serbs and Roma from Kosovo. The evaluation took place between January and June 2000 with the evaluation team visiting Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia- Herzegovina and Serbia. The evaluation was multi-sectoral. It examined preparedness and initial response, appropriateness of response, coverage, protection, effectiveness and impact, efficiency/cost-effectiveness, connectedness and performance standards. The food and nutrition component of the DEC response was therefore only a small component of the evaluation but nevertheless reported interesting and important findings.

Bread distribution in Albania. (Tearfund)

Relative to the large food aid programmes implemented by agencies such as WFP and CRS during the crisis, the DEC agencies spent very little on food and nutrition programmes. The evaluation conclusions are, therefore, not generalisable to the overall food and nutrition response but only apply to the response of DEC agencies. The main conclusions about the provision of food and nutritional support by DEC agencies during the crisis were as follows:

• Only 17 percent of DEC funds were spent on food aid in phase 1 and less than 3 percent in phase 2. It was appropriate for DEC agencies to concentrate on areas other than food aid, (especially in phase 2 when the priorities were to ensure security and weatherproofed shelter for returnees to Kosovo) given that malnutrition was not an imminent problem, that there was a glut of food aid and that DEC funds could be used flexibly. Local communities also provided support to Kosovars, especially in Albania, where local families hosted the refugees, and mosques and restaurants provided free meals.
  Among the DEC agencies, the church agencies spent the highest proportion of their budgets on food. This may partly reflect the churches traditional role as a provider of food and shelter to those in need and the existence of grass roots networks for distribution.
• At the early stages of the emergency food aid was given for nutritional reasons, however later on in the emergency it appears to have been given as a supplement or short-term income transfer. Therefore, cost-effectiveness of food aid, i.e. the cost of supplying food aid in relation to its value to the beneficiary though an important impact indicator, was not monitored or evaluated during the programme.
• There was very little assessment or analysis of the food situation of the refugees in the period March-June 1999. This meant that decisions on quantity and quality of food rations were largely supply rather than needs driven.
• UNHCR was responsible for providing guidelines on the provision of complementary foods additional to the basic ration. Certain provisos were stipulated by UNHCR including; not distributing fresh meat, baby foods, infant formula or chocolate. However, many NGOs did not stick to these provisos and instead designed their own complementary food parcels. This meant that there was enormous variation in rations in terms of the number of items included, calorific values, the cost and value to the beneficiary. For example, one NGO food parcel contained 18 items including Turkish delight and chocolate. Consistency of supply is more difficult to attain with complementary food items and can lead to heightened beneficiary expectations, which cannot always be met.
• High cost parcels (around £10 per parcel) containing luxury items of limited nutritional value were distributed using DEC funds. Money could have been better spent elsewhere.
• The majority of DEC funded food aid programmes were targeted at the more vulnerable groups both in terms of the type of beneficiary and the countries covered.
• There were problems in targeting. Although there were few reports of refugees/IDPs totally missing out on food aid rations, there was potential for duplication and thus wastage, i.e. families getting more than one lot of distributions. Duplication was not likely to be an extensive problem as food aid needs were not great.
• Where the needy in the local population (i.e. host populations in Albania and Macedonia) were included in the distribution, incidences of ill feeling among the local population arose. These were mostly manifested through social pressure on local partners to support one family rather than another or to share aid equally between all citizens.
• Poor monitoring and reporting of food aid distribution increased the potential for a lack of uniformity in approach.
• Local purchase of food was not necessarily cheaper than international purchase. However, positive aspects of local purchase could sometimes be speed, with less likelihood of transport and importation delays as well as support to the local economy.
• Well-established nutritional guidelines were ignored in some instances, e.g. failure to meet Sphere minimum standards of assessment and analysis; items included in complementary food rations, inclusion of milk powder in rations. This raises the issue of lack of awareness of guidelines and the need for adequate technical support in the field, especially to local partners who may have limited experience of emergencies.

The impact of the crisis on the food security of host populations in Albania and Macedonia appears to have been minimal.

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Reference this page

Kosovo Evaluation. Field Exchange 11, December 2000. p23. www.ennonline.net/fex/11/kosovo

(ENN_3472)