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Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme: Power, Politics and Practice

Summary of research^*

Location: Ethiopia

What we know: The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is an established, large-scale social protection effort by the Government of Ethiopia targeting rural, food-insecure households.

What this article adds: A recent qualitative study explored the role of power and politics in the PSNP in seven communities in two regional states of Ethiopia. The authors conclude that while there is positive impact, the implementation of the programme is problematic. In these communities, the PSNP was highly politicised, systematically neglected all of the participatory components outlined in the programme design, excluded the feedback mechanisms and entrenched political power. Understanding the existing political climate in operational environments is critical.

Ethiopia has made significant progress in reducing poverty, with a decrease of the population living in poverty from 46% in 2005 to 30% by 2010 (the population increased from 57 to 88 million during the same period). The country has one of the fastest-growing economies in the world; gross domestic product (GDP) was between 8.6 and 13.6% from 2004 to 2016. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is one of the Government of Ethiopia’s (GoE) most effective programmes to support people living in rural areas, who make up over 80% of the population.

The PSNP began in 2005 to support food-insecure households and enable them to overcome vulnerabilities without eroding their assets, and over time to support households to build assets. In 2015, more than seven million people had been supported by it, with an expected expansion to ten million people. The PSNP is mainly implemented by the GoE, with assistance from development partners. The programme, now in its fourth phase, has been widely studied and found to have positively impacted food-insecure households. Some studies claim that the impact is modest compared with progress made in comparable non-client households, although even critical assessments point to significant positive change. The PSNP has three key components (see Box 1). A recent study explored the roles of power and politics in the implementation of the PSNP. The authors contrast the plan (the Programme Implementation Manual) with its practice and explore why divergences may be occurring.

Methods

The qualitative research methods involved detailed interviews with clients and former clients of the PSNP, as well as relevant government staff (community leaders, development agents, community health workers and school staff) in seven communities in southern Ethiopia from two regional states. Given political sensitivities in the country, researcher connections were utilised to select communities for the study. These relationships were pivotal in establishing the trust needed to gain insight that might not otherwise have been shared. Interviews consisted of four group interviews with each community-based government body (in groups of two to six staff members), and 46 key informant interviews with PSNP clients, which were conducted voluntarily and anonymously. A large number of issues were raised by both government staff and community members; this research focused primarily on the common concerns and key discrepancies in the experiences of PSNP clients. Due to regional diversity within Ethiopia, this study was never expected to have great external validity.

Findings

Selection and graduation

• Fair and transparent selection is one of PSNP’s core principles, yet current clients and graduates in all the communities voiced concern regarding the lack of transparency in client selection, and why and how graduation occurs.
• Described in the Manual as “community-based targeting”, in reality local leaders and government staff selected clients without any community participation – a process that resulted in bias, with family members and friends of local leaders gaining entry preference and holding longer terms.
• Selection decisions were also linked to political affiliation, with the exclusion of known opposition party supporters.
• Data supports claims that numbers of graduates are determined at higher levels of government, based on quotas to ‘confirm’ that the programme is successful (i.e. clients are expected to graduate after five years).
• A number of political purposes are at play; the PSNP is being used for political patronage, punishment (clients were graduated for political reasons), and for broader political objectives of meeting regional and national targets.

Lodging an appeal

• According to the Manual, the grievance mechanism is run by an Appeals Committee at the community and district levels, but not one current or former client had heard of this.
• Overlapping responsibilities (i.e. staff likely to be on both committees that select clients as well as theoretical ones that handle appeals) reduce effectiveness.
• Questions were not escalated to higher levels of government due to fear of repercussions; e.g. being labelled as an anti-government agent.

Participation

• The manual states that public works’ programmes should be decided by the community members, but in practice government staff choose and direct group leaders to repair roads, etc. PSNP clients have no participation in the decision-making process.

Work commitment

• There is limited adherence to the per person working cap (no more than 15 days/month per adult household member) set out in the Manual to prevent overburdening clients.
• In practice, each public works client was responsible for working six days per week for six months of the year; also ‘voluntary’ participation in works continued beyond six months (refusal may be equated with political opposition, resulting in exclusion from benefits).
• The Government benefits from lack of adherence to labour caps, as most of the work involves government-run facilities such as schools and roads.

Power tends to corrupt

• There were multiple reports and examples of corruption, e.g. public workers made to farm land belonging to the community chairman, or people with a good relationship with the chairman were enrolled in the PSNP but not required to work.

Discussion

The study authors conclude that the programme has had a large and beneficial impact, but its implementation has been shaped and co-opted to maintain and strengthen political power. Furthermore, the findings challenge donors and practitioners to recognise the ways in which their funding and approaches to programme design are both empowering and disempowering individuals and to better understand the existing political climate in operational environments.

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Reference this page

Cochrane, Logan, and Y Tamiru (). Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme: Power, Politics and Practice. Field Exchange 53, November 2016. p14. www.ennonline.net/fex/53/ethiopiassafetynetprogramme

(ENN_5360)